Accordingly the missiles benefited in particular. Whether they are under American command, or completely within the control of one of our allies or subject to joint control, they present the severest problems for the preservation of a deterrent force. It conceives the problem of deterrence as that of simply matching or exceeding the aggressor's capability to strike first. Finally, it is important to be clear whether the Thor and Jupiter actually increase the flexibility or range of response available to our allies. A totalitarian country can preserve secrecy about the capabilities and disposition of his forces very much better than a Western democracy. At the second hurdle — surviving enemy offense — ground alert systems placed deep within a warning net look good against a manned bomber attack, much less good against intercontinental ballistic missiles, and not good at all against ballistic missiles launched from the sea. TOS 7. Deterrence is a matter of comparative risks. This article identifies a consistent approach to stability across a wide range of conflict situations at the heart of Thomas Schelling's strategic theory. First, since thermonuclear weapons give an enormous advantage to the aggressor, it takes great ingenuity and realism at any given level of nuclear technology to devise a stable equilibrium. Assistant Policy Researcher, RAND; Ph.D. This is the basis for the common view. This is one reason deterrence is only a part and not the whole of a military and foreign policy. It is quite erroneous to suppose that by contrast with manned bombers the first IRBMs can be launched almost as simply as pressing a button. Schmader and colleagues (2008) integrated process model, which synthesizes earlier work on mediators of stereotype threat, incorporates a balance theory perspective of self-integrity threat to explain how stereotype threat can trigger a chain of psychological reactions. The simplified (and popularized) easy deterrence narrative is a pas- This is clearly an important hurdle in the early Sixties. Yet I would conjecture that if one considers the implications of modern surface-to-air missiles in the context of conventional war in which the attacker has to make many sorties and expose himself to recurring attrition, these weapons would look ever so much better than they do when faced, for example, with the heroic task of knocking down 99 percent of a wave of, say one thousand nuclear bombers. Perhaps the first step in dispelling the nearly universal optimism about the stability of deterrence would be to recognize the difficulties in analyzing the uncertainties and interactions between our own wide range of choices and the moves open to the Soviets. Finally, overseas bases affect in many critical ways, political and economic as well as military, the status of the alliance. Terrorism - Terrorism - Types of terrorism: Various attempts have been made to distinguish among types of terrorist activities. Quite the contrary is the case. Only a very short time ago the ballistic missile itself was supposed to be intrinsically invulnerable on the ground. The estimate of 50 million deaths in the Second World War includes some 20 million Soviet citizens and an estimated six million Jews and two to three million others killed in Nazi concentration camps. Plagiarism Prevention 4. When studied in relation to the 19th century, we can see that it is a major part of both contemporary and modern literature, thinking and politics The interdependencies of limited and total war decisions make it clear that the development of any powerful limited war capability, and in particular a nuclear one, only underlines the need, at the same time, for insuring retaliation against all-out attack. structure of people’s opinions about other individuals and objects as well as the perceived relation Is deterrence a necessary consequence of both sides having a nuclear delivery capability, and is all-out war nearly obsolete? The state system and national power, balance of power, balance of terror, game theory, psychological aspects of international conflict, decision making, diplomacy and negotiation, war, disarmament, and collective security. A surprising proportion of the debate on defense policy has betrayed this confusion. Such a situation is clearly extremely unstable. However, some of the principal conclusions about deterrence in the early Sixties can be fairly firmly based, and based on public information. The state-of-the-art during the past decade or so has been such that this has meant a drastic rise in costs at distances less than those from bases well within the United States to targets well within Russia. Mere membership in the nuclear club might carry with it prestige, as the applicants and nominees expect, but it will be rather expensive, and in time it will be clear that it does not necessarily confer any of the expected privileges enjoyed by the two charter members. And the problem is a serious one, therefore, not only against ballistic missile attacks but, for example, against low altitude or various circuitous attacks by manned aircraft. As mentioned earlier, "Balance of Terror," the 15th episode broadcast, is the first time the audience got a substantial look at the sociopolitical setup of the Federation. Fortunately now, the humankind has fully realized the dangers of balance of terror. Some increase in the number of armed bombers aloft is to be expected. Similarly, advances in anti-tank wire-guided missiles and anti-personnel fragmentation weapons, which have been mentioned from time to time in the press, might help redress the current balance of East-West conventional forces without, however, removing the necessity for spending more money in procurement as well as research and development. One justification for this move argues that it disperses retaliatory weapons and that this is the most effective sanction against the thermonuclear aggressor. Balance of Power Theory As a theory, balance of power predicts that rapid changes in international power and status, especially attempts by one state to conquer a region, will provoke counterbalancing actions. The Balance of Terror Theory: A Comparative Analysis By Terrance Jones Even if one accepts the balance –of-terror theory, including the belief that there are almost no circumstances in which the Soviets would launch a deliberate attack on the continental United States (and vice versa), some important strategic problems remain. There is of course something in the notion that forcing the enemy to attack many political entities increases the seriousness of his decision. It was our bomb. Their importance here is both more considerable and likely to be more lasting than their increasingly restricted utility to deter attack on the United States. Systems relying on extensive movement by land, perhaps by truck caravan, are an obvious example; the introduction of these on European roads, as is sometimes suggested, would raise grave questions for the governments of some of our allies. One of the most important of these assumptions — that a general thermonuclear war is extremely unlikely — is held in common by most of the critics of our defense policy as well as by its proponents. New York: Wiley. Written by Paul Schneider and directed by Vincent McEveety, it first aired on December 15, 1966, and a repeat broadcast was aired on August 3, 1967. Though deterrence is not enough in itself, it is vital. 4. Sharp reversals in a limited war can increase the dangers of waiting. Though they were not in themselves likely to trigger misunderstanding, the B-47 accidents this year at Sidi Slimane and at Florence, South Carolina, and the recent Nike explosion (of which an Army officer in the local command said, "A disaster which could not happen did.") After making allowance for the unreliability and inaccuracy of the missile, this means a ratio of some ten for one or better. This sort of game, as anyone who has tried it knows, is extremely difficult to analyze and necessitates caution in making any early judgment as to the comparative merits of the many competing systems. Moreover, these probabilities are not independent. IV-Conclusion. To achieve safety by brute numbers in so unfavorable a competition is not likely to be viable economically or politically. These are the choices that determine whether a weapons system will have any genuine capability in the realistic circumstances of a war. On the other hand, if it is clear that the aggressor too will suffer catastrophic damage in the event of his aggression, he then has strong reason not to attack, even though he can administer great damage. Violence is of course never a good option, whether through warfare or terrorism, but political balance of power always normally results in a standoff of non-violence. Whether or not nuclear weapons favor the west in limited war, there still remains the question of whether such limitations could be made stable. But in the case of an enemy ballistic missile attack is most illuminating. Deterrence theory and practice from the Cold War to the twenty-first century Related names. The unvaryingly immoderate claims for each new weapons system should make us wary of the latest "technological breakthroughs." The balance of terror theory is the basis for some of the more light-hearted suggestions: if deterrence is automatic, strategic weapons on one side cancel those of the other, and it should be easy for both sides to give them up. Massive retaliation against even minor threats, since it exposed us to no danger, might be credible. The awareness of our mortality, TMT suggests, terrifies us, and forces us to adapt to it in some way. But the numbers he uses are very wide of the mark. The early B-52 radius is roughly that of the B-36; the B-47, roughly that of the B-50 or B-29. An aggressive version of balance of power. One intelligent commentator, Richard Rovere, recently expressed the common view: "If the Russians had ten thousand warheads and a missile for each, and we had ten hydrogen bombs and ten obsolete bombers," ..."aggression would still be a folly that would appeal only to an insane adventurer." In suggesting that a carefully planned surprise attack can be checkmated almost effortlessly, that in short we may resume our deep pre-Sputnik sleep, it is wrong and its nearly universal acceptance is terribly dangerous. On our side we must consider an enormous variety of strategic weapons which might compose our force, and for each of these several alternative methods of basing and operation. Full and comprehensive Nuclear Disarmament and global agreement on arms control must be secured for finally ending the balance of terror in international relations. The important thing would be to find some discontinuities if these steps are not to lead too smoothly to general war. Moreover, when one considers the many hundreds of vehicles involved, the cumulative probability of accidental war would rapidly approach certainty with repeated false alarms. There is no question that it was genuinely urgent not only to meet the Russian threat but to do so visibly, in order to save the loosening NATO alliance. In spite of deterrence a thermonuclear war could be tripped by accident or miscalculation. What I have said does not imply that all deterrent strategies risk accident equally. Liddell Hart’s History of the First World War (Cassell, 1970) and History of the Second World War contain much detailed information on casualties. In this respect the ready optimism on the subject reflects the basic confusion, referred to at the beginning of this essay, as to the nature of the technological race. But perhaps, as a small aid toward making such decisions more likely, we should contemplate the possibility that they may not be made. These risks could be smaller than the alternative of not striking. Game theory was not seriously adopted by the military until the 1950s as far as I know. It is important not to confuse our uncertainty with his. Of all the many poor ways to start a war, this would be perhaps the worst. But if they are provided with shelters capable of resisting pressures of 100 pounds per square inch, approximately 60 such weapons would be required; and deep rock shelters might force the total up to over a thousand. (If the high cost of overcoming an earlier obstacle — using extreme dispersal or airborne alert or the like — limits the number of planes or missiles bought, this limitation is likely to be penalized disproportionately here.) The problem of intercontinental versus overseas bombers is mainly a matter of costs, provided we have the time and freedom to choose the composition of our force and our budget size. What can we say then on the question as to whether general war is unlikely? The basis for the hopeful impression that they will not is rather vague, including a mixture of hypothetical properties of ballistic missiles in which perhaps the dominant element is their supposed much more rapid, "push-button" response. Image Guidelines 5. Some of the principal difficulties I have sketched will remain and others will grow. After the Thor, Atlas, and Titan there are a number of promising developments. C-Intervention in the Third World. Western forces at the end of the war were larger than those of the Soviet Union and its satellites. When not coupled with the ability to strike in retaliation, such a capability would suggest — erroneously to be sure in the case of the democracies — an intention to strike first. They assume, for example, that the enemy will attack in mass "over-the-Arctic" through our Distant Early Warning line, with bombers refueled over Canada — all resulting in plenty of warning. The cost to buy and operate various weapons systems must be seriously considered. Most hopefully, it is sometimes assumed that such attacks will be preceded by days of visible preparations for moving ground troops. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Missile accuracy would more than double. B.H. The book is intended for both supporters and opponents of nuclear deterrence--indeed for all who believe that nuclear issues cannot be wished away or laid aside but must be addressed with knowledge, even if this means thinking about the unthinkable. It is now widely known that intercontinental ballistic missiles will have hydrogen warheads, and this fact, a secret at the time, invalidates Mr. Blackett's calculations and, I might say, much of his optimism on the stability of the balance of terror. (3) They might support the landing of tankers after they have fueled the bombers and so permit the transfer of larger amounts of fuel. Although it is quite hopeless to look for an inspection scheme which would permit abandonment of the deterrent, this does not mean that some partial agreement on inspection and limitation might not help to reduce the chance of any sizable surprise attack. The United States response and its sequels stated correctly that such flights had never been undertaken except in planned exercises — and moreover would not be undertaken in response to such high false-alarm rate warnings. The most important of these is the definition of security. We added, however, to cap the argument, that if the Russians were really worried about surprise attack they would accept the President's "open skies" proposal. 2-The War in Vietnam. Our allies were fearful that the Soviet ballistic missiles might mean that we were no longer able or willing to retaliate against the Soviet Union in case of an attack on them. And second, this technology itself is changing with fantastic speed. They must have also the ability (b) to survive enemy attacks, (c) to make and communicate the decision to retaliate, (d) to reach enemy territory with fuel enough to complete their mission, (e) to penetrate enemy active defenses, that is fighters and surface-to-air missiles, and (f) to destroy the target in spite of any passive civil defense in the form of dispersal or protective construction or evacuation of the target itself. Because there is not much space for obtaining warning — in any case, there are no deep-warning radar nets — and, since most of our overseas bases are close to deep water from which submarines might launch missiles, the warning problem is very much more severe than for bases in the interior of the United States.